Crazy Equity Curves Continued

•November 12, 2009 • Leave a Comment

Continuation of this post, I also found a toy model on the forum where you can play around with position sizing and portfolio allocation between cash, etc.

One consideration I forgot to mention but was also pointed out by an astute poster was that as capital grows in your “risky” strategy, you need a mechanism to rebalance capital. Otherwise there comes a point where the capital in ‘risk’ and the position size become a large portion of the overall portfolio capital and hence you risk even larger overall Draw Down. For example, if $50,000 of a $1MM account turns into say $100,000 and you risk 100% capital, well now your position size is ~9% of your overall portfolio…

ScreenHunter_01 Nov. 12 11.17

What to do with crazy Equity Curves…?

•November 11, 2009 • 1 Comment

Below is a quote I pulled of the TradeStation Forum from the same individual, Joe Joseph, that posted the webinar in the previous post.

Performing this exercise as intended with one year of live trading data and a hypothetical starting account size of $1,000,000 (for simple numbers) we get the following result:

It turns out that an account that starts with $32,000 and risks 31% on each trade makes almost twice as much as an account starting at $1,000,000 which risks 2% on each trade. An account starting at $75,000 risking 14% on each trade makes just as much as the $1,000,000 at 2% account. And this is just after one year.

Further, after two years, the smaller accounts start winning at the $250,000 at 4% level and the margin of victory grows dramatically for smaller, more aggressive accounts.

The specific numbers are not terribly relevant, but what is illustrated is that if you break your account into small chunks and trade each of those chunks more aggressively, you will actually make more money once enough time has passed.

What’s even more remarkable is that the risk to initial capital is actually lowered at the same time. As an example, the maximum possible drawdown on initial capital for the 4% case is 25%, whereas for the full $1,000,000 account traded at 2% the maximum possible drawdown is 100%.

Even better than this, a trader who chooses to risk the entire 1,000,000 account and is unfortunate enough to fail loses her ability to fund another system with this capital, whereas the trader who broke her $1m account into four $250,000 pieces and traded one of those pieces at a time with 4% has four opportunities to succeed.

There is more to be learned here, but this should provide a good start.

At first what seems to be a brilliant insight is simply mean-variance optimization. A financial adviser will suggest you make an allocation into a “risky” asset (stocks) as well as a “riskless” asset (CDs, Bonds). The net effect of this diversification is a larger absolute return over investing 100% in stocks or 100% in bonds.

However in strategy development, this methodology can offer some interesting alternatives. We no longer have to dismiss erratic equity curves offhand. Say we develop a strategy with fantastic absolute return but relatively large draw down; We can easily cut DD percentage in half by doubling the initial capital, right? Some might say that’s cheating! Well is it? Your primary goal at the end of some arbitrary period is to have more money then you started without losing a lot of sleep. Compare the various scenarios and find out if it is in fact true. Here’s one idea, place 90% of your capital in T-Bills and utilize the remaining 10% to buy/sell speculative options. Using this thought process we now have a use for some of this equity curves we would have dismissed previously.

Webinar

•November 11, 2009 • Leave a Comment

Below is a decent and short webinar (~45m) from John Jospeh of NextD systems who trades Trend-Following strategies on various equity indices.

https://admin.connectpro.acrobat.com/_a816688188/p40129421/

I found some interesting conclusions:

Continue reading ‘Webinar’

Sharpen Sharpe Ratios

•November 8, 2009 • Leave a Comment

In this previous post, I discussed some of criticism of sharpe ratios and particularly the focus on investors and prospective employers on a certain sharpe ratio. The problem with sharpe is it assumes ‘normal’ distribution of returns (return / std. dev of returns). This unfairly penalizes large percentage positive returns.

The good guys at the Yale School of Management wrote a paper and presentation on a method to manipulate or artificially boost the Sharpe Ratio of any strategy, useful for marketing purposes. It simply takes the existing portfolio and sells OTM Calls and Puts on the holdings or a corresponding index. This has the effect of cutting off the large positive portion of the return distribution and elongating the tail on the negative end:

ScreenHunter_03 Nov. 08 21.00

If we break this down synthetically, the portfolio is actually long stock, short strangle. Further breaking it down, the long stock, short call is equivalent to a naked put, plus the additional naked put, the strategy is equal to short multiple naked puts. Amazing isn’t it?? Part of the presentation mentions a fund called Integral Asset Management which managed money for the Art Institute of Chicago and proceeded to lose ~$50MM dollars. The managers in question probably retained a nice 2% fee and 20% performance fee for losing a ton of money. How would you like to get paid to lose money? I would, I would! lol.

I also had experience with a recent short premium CTA, Zenith resources. The managers had an amazing fee arrangement, they charged 0% management fee and 30% performance fee. Brilliant! Your investors suspect the fund is confident enough in their ability to achieve a return that it forgoes a management fee. Meanwhile the manager actually just got their hands on a potentially very valuable call option. And the SEC is worried about insider trading, ha….

Experiments in Spread-Betting Part II

•November 5, 2009 • Leave a Comment

ME = IDIOT

This blog and its writings represent my public, although still ‘private’ identity, front to the world. As such I try to keep the writing as professional and error proof as possible. As many have likely gathered I do not do a very good job of that as it is so when I make an error in calculation or conclusion, it looks especially bad. A few days ago I posted an experiment I was conducting on exotic options and a new systematic strategy. Thank god I paper traded it because as I was reviewing the results today I had what a co-worker once dubbed as a ’senior moment’ and when entering barrier levels on a daily basis since Nov 3, I had an incorrect parameter as one of the inputs and hence, incorrect barrier levels.

Continue reading ‘Experiments in Spread-Betting Part II’

Experiments in Spread-Betting

•November 3, 2009 • Leave a Comment

A close relative to DNT bets are Expiry Range Bets, which is basically a bet on the close being between 2 barrier values at a certain date in the future. Obviously this resembles a European exercise whereas DNT resemble American style exercise since the options is knocked-out if the price touches the barrier anytime before expiry. I ran an idea through TradeStation which pumped out some levels based on volatility and a probability of win over the length of the data. My thought is if I can purchase my bets for less then my probability of win then I will have positive expectancy and should make money over enough bets. In other words, if the probability of price closing between X and Y is 75%, then anything less then 75/100 is a buy.

ScreenHunter_05 Nov. 02 23.36

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Will the real bad guy’s please stand up?

•October 31, 2009 • Leave a Comment

Warning: Saturday Afternoon prognostications ahead!

Recently the House Financial Services Committee passed a 67 to 1 vote to required Hedge Funds, Private Equity Funds, and even Offshore Funds to register with respective regulators. Add on top of that a slew of insider trading and fraud cases hitting the wires, most notably Raj Rajaratnam from Galleon funds. While these have no doubt cast a shadow of the advisory landscape, you will find very very few financial professionals surprised by any of this. Wall Street’s biggest advantage is information or technological arbitrage; these players either know more then you or have more capital to invest in technology. It’s somewhat understood though in most circles, in fact, one can say insider activity gives many of us an ‘edge’ in terms of technical analysis (aggressive buying usually displays itself in some sort of trend or relative strength) or for example option flow and implied volatility spikes.

Continue reading ‘Will the real bad guy’s please stand up?’

User Question

•October 28, 2009 • Leave a Comment

From BossG:

Hi LargeCapTrader,

Could you write a post about the tools you have used in your trading career? i.e. matlab (with what data feed?), trading platforms, etc. Any info on what the pro’s use or opinions would be great.

Keep up the great work!

First off, thanks for the comment and if you’re ever in NYC I owe you a beer! Here’s a brief overview of software that I’ve seen, used, or know for certain are used on Wall Street:

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The Amazing Stock Bee

•October 26, 2009 • 1 Comment

In a previous post, I mentioned one blog (and so far the only one I can recall) that actually resulted in $$$ in my pocket. That blog is the excellent Stock Bee run by Pradeep Bonde aka EasyGuru. If memory serves me correct, EasyGuru originally started out as a marketing/advertising consultant in India and also taught MBA level courses in marketing. At some point he took his earnings and began researching methods of speculating in financial markets.

His methodology is an interesting mix of event-driven, momentum, relative strength, and technical analysis. It is based on the works of Investors Business Daily, Dan Zanger, while its core is based on academic research first published by  R. Ball & P. Brown, ‘An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers’, Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn 1968, pp. 159-178.

The strategy invests in securities with fundamental catalysts and specifically those reporting positive earnings/revenues surprises compared to consensus estimates and/or combined with increasing forecast guidance. StockBee then filters these securities looking for specific technical patterns which usually incorporate opening gaps, volume driven break-outs, and buying new highs. It is a long-only strategy designed to capture the impending momentum of those securities with specific catalysts.

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The Relentless March Forward

•October 21, 2009 • Leave a Comment

The market has been resilient. It’s not necessarily ‘fluctuated’ as JP Morgan once said but more like a slow, low volatile march higher. Where it goes is anybodies guess, but most people have guessed it should go lower. Admittedly I am in that camp and long VXX along with SPY Calendars (long vol, short delta). Normally I don’t waste time pontificating on the direction of the market, all my strategies require is movement! Up and down action is where I can make a lot of money, trends can work too just that it requires volatility.

While a slow uptrend like this can play havoc for someone like me, the vast majority of the public is of the buy & hold variety either through retirement accounts, pension funds, or mutual funds. So to the general population and politicians the picture looks rosy. However here is a summary of some very interesting data for the bear case:

Continue reading ‘The Relentless March Forward’